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GUIDED DEMOCRACY FOREIGN POLICY: 1960-1965
PRESIDENT SUKARNO MOVES FROM NON- 
ALIGNMENT TO CONFRONTATION*
Frederick P. Bunnell
Well, frankly I tell you:
I belong to the group of people 
who are bound in spiritual long­
ing by the Romanticism of Revolu­
tion. I am inspired by it, I am 
fascinated by it, I am completely 
absorbed by it, I am crazed, I am 
obsessed by the Romanticism of 
Revolution. And for this I utter 




The President * s Foreign Policy
In the 1960's Indonesian foreign policy under Guided Democ­
racy became an increasingly militant policy of struggle or con­
frontation against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism 
(or nekolim).' D  Although this policy had its roots in Indonesia's 
particularly traumatic emancipation from Dutch colonialism, its 
evolution under Guided Democracy depended primarily on President
* Editors' note: Originally prepared for the Asia Society
Seminar on the Foreign Policies of Southeast Asian States 
held in New York on May 14 and 15, 1965, Mr. Bunnell's 
essay was presented in a somewhat altered and severely 
shortened form at the Society of Asian Studies Conference 
in New York on April 4, 1966. Apart from changing to the 
past tense in referring to Guided Democracy foreign policy, 
Mr. Bunnell has made no attempt to incorporate into his 
presentation the insights and data provided by events sub­
sequent to the affair of October 1, 1965. He has also not 
attempted to consider the published views of other authors, 
such as Mr. Arnold Brackman and Dr. Bernard Gordon, whose 
recent books have treated the same subject from divergent 
perspectives.
(1) Nekolim is the acronym for neo-colonialism, colonialism, 
and imperialism. Originated in early 1964 by Lieutenant 
General Yani, Commander of the Army, nekolim quickly be­
came a fundamental part of Indonesian political language.
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Sukarno. Despite the unquestioned power of the Indonesian army 
throughout this period and the prominence of the Communist 
Party (PKI) particularly in the latter years, the President 
maintained a personal dominance in foreign policy until the 
abortive coup of October 1, 1965 fostered the appearance of 
a new political system in Indonesia.(2)
Because of the President's determinant role in the emer­
gence of Indonesia's confrontation policies, it is his motiva­
tions that provide the key to understanding Indonesian policy. 
Essentially these motivations consisted of the ideological- 
psychological impulses (and some such term is necessary) of a 
fervent nationalist. On the ideological level Sukarno embraced 
a neo-Marxist-Leninist view of contemporary history that pits 
the old capitalist nations of the West in a dialectic struggle 
with the emergent nations and the new socialist states. It was 
this idea that underlay Sukarno's confrontation policy. But 
the dynamic of the policy was the psychological need for self- 
respect felt by a political elite long-humiliated by colonial­
ism. That need could best be filled by the quest for Indonesian 
prestige as a leader in the destruction of the perpetrators of 
Indonesia's humbling colonial experience —  the imperialist 
states o£ the West. These basic ideological-psychological im­
pulses were, of course, not the exclusive elements in Sukarno's 
motivations, but in foreign policy they appear to have played 
the decisive role.
The evidence of the importance of these impulses in the 
President's policies is necessarily circumstantial, but none­
theless impressive. There is a basic consistency in both the 
nationalistic content and the emotional character of the Sukarno 
ideology as it has developed in his speeches and actions over 
a HO-year period. That record provides at least a clue to the 
consistent elements in the thinking and psychology of Sukarno.
In addition, there is the testimony of the officials and the 
politically-conscious who have lived in Sukarno's political 
sphere for much of his long career. Both these sources point 
to the hypothesis of a basic consistency in Sukarno's ideologi-
(2) One major factor in Sukarno's dominance was his ability 
to balance the army and the Communist Party against each 
other. See Kahin, George McT., "Indonesia", in Kahin, 
George McT., ed., Major Governments of Asia, 2nd ed. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, i§63), pp. 6H9-652.
For a more detailed discussion of this relationship in the 
period from 1958-1962, see Feith, Herbert, "The Dynamics 
of Guided Democracy", in McVey, Ruth, ed., Indonesia (New 
Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 196&), pp. 325- 
366. Also see a more recent revised statement of the 
balance relationship in Feith, Herbert, "President Sukarno, 
the Army, and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape",
Asian Survey, Vol. H, August 196H, pp. 969-980.
39
cal c r e d o . W h a t  was new in recent years was the effort by 
Sukarno to project on the international stage the slogans of 
Indonesia's national revolution.
Even if one can establish a basic ideological consistency 
in Sukarno's public career, the relative importance of his ideo­
logical credo in his policy decisions remains moot. Certainly 
the emotional character of the man and the militant tone of his 
speeches point to an important role for that credo. To be sure 
these vague ideological-psychological impulses did not prescribe 
specific courses of action, but they did set long-term goals, 
maintain fears, and establish priorities. Moreover, as Guided 
Democracy persisted in its efforts at indoctrination, it is 
likely that the state ideology tended to take a firmer hold on 
both the political-bureaucratic elite and the political public. 
An atmosphere and a momentum was generated that in turn rein­
forced the predilections of the original authors. Even the 
President could not be immune to this secondary effect of in­
doctrination programs.
Nationalist or Communist?
If one concludes that the role of ideological-psychologi­
cal factors was crucial in the President's foreign policy, how 
does this affect other interpretations of Indonesian policy 
under Guided Democracy? The significance lies first of all in 
judging to what extent the President leaned toward communism 
internationally and nationally. The frequent Western charge 
often echoed by Indians and Yugoslavs —  that Sukarno was a 
spokesman for the Chinese Communist view must be qualified.
(3) A further indication of the compatibility of the content 
and tone of Sukarno's speeches during the colonial period 
with those of 1965 was the government regulation instituted 
in 196H that all Indonesian newspapers print daily a selec­
tion from Sukarno's early speeches. Among the most famous 
of these and thus the ones now most frequently printed are 
the 1930 trial speech, "Indonesia Menggugdt", and the 1933 
"Mentjapai Indonesia Merdeka".
(*♦) A rather recent instance of this conscious effort was the 
application of the domestic political slogan, nasakom, to 
the international sphere. Paralleling the Sukarno concept 
of the "riew emerging forces", nasakom internationally meant 
the alliance of nationalist, religious, and communist nations 
and elements in a common front to defeat nekolim. As such 
it served as an especially useful device in Indonesia's 
effort to broaden the appeal of her ideology in Afro-Asian 
countries by offering a message somewhat distinctive from 
the Chinese People's Republic. For an example of nasakom 
applied internationally by Sukarno, see his speech at the 
celebration of the H5th anniversary of the PKI in The 
Indonesian Herald, May 2*t, 1965.
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The similarity of the Sukarno credo with much in the Chinese 
line is undeniable. But many other nationalist leaders shared 
this affinity with the Chinese ideology. Moreover, the impli­
cation in the charge that Sukarno was speaking for someone 
else —  'either in the sense that he had cynically become their 
spokesman for some price or in the sense that Sukarno's views 
were readily adaptable because of their lack of firm roots in 
his personal history —  must be denied. In short, the sugges­
tion of either subservience or opportunism is questionable 
because of the historical depth and consistency in Sukarno's 
views.
At the same time, such an argument does not deny the fact 
that the Indonesians and the Chinese were engaged in political 
collaboration. But here the content of the consistent Sukarno 
credo is relevant. The central thread —  it appears —  was a 
vigorous nationalism that could never knowingly brook inter­
ference even from its most anti-imperialist friend. Moreover, 
even as she collaborated with China in the anti-imperialist 
struggle, it is plain that Indonesia retained not only her own 
ambitions for leadership, but a firm attachment to her own na­
tional ideology.(5) Finally, it is noteworthy that the Chinese 
approach to Sukarno since 1960 had been based on a shrewd aware­
ness of his personal and national pride. '*>)
The nationalist content and the historical consistency of 
Sukarno's ideology also force questioning of speculation that 
the President may have been seeking to deliver power to the 
Communist Party.''' Predicated on the President's admitted 
attraction to the PKI's revolutionary ideology, this speculation 
underestimated the Sukarno devotion to Indonesian national unity. 
It has been his self-conscious lifetime task to forge a viable 
accomodation among the nationalist, religious, and communist 
groups. Without such an accommodation the President —  and 
most politically aware Indonesians —  foresaw a physical clash 
between these antagonistic groups. Such a clash would not only 
threaten Indonesia's internal unity, but it would impair her 
quest for leadership abroad.
(5) See, for example, the lead article in ibid., December 31, 
1963.
( 6) See Mozingo, David P., Sino-Indonesian Relations: An
Overview, 1955-1965 (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 
Memorandum RM-H6H1-PR, July 1965)., pp. 1-5.
(7) Such speculation was rife in Djakarta diplomatic circles 
from at least 1963. For a careful statement of the issues 
see Feith, Herbert, "President Sukarno, the Army, and the 
Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape”, pp. 977-980.
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Because of this premium on national unity, Sukarno in­
sisted that he favored no single party or ideological current. 
The visible increase in the PKI's political position under 
Guided Democracy —  particularly from the summer of 1962 —  
tended to contradict this profession of impartiality.(8) But 
two factors must be recalled. One was the political sophisti­
cation of the PKI in maximizing its power. The other was the 
President's acute awareness that the long-sought political 
accommodation had been delayed chiefly because of distrust of 
the communists in the other political circles. If then the 
President permitted a PKI expansion, it was in part because he 
felt that only as the communists were given positions of re­
sponsibility could they be assimilated into the Indonesian 
revolution, could they lose the threatened feeling of an out­
side group, could their rivals come to accept them as partners 
as well as rivals, and could it be assured that they would be­
come nationalist communists.
Sukarno’s increasing advocacy of the PKI must be under­
stood also as a means of reducing the power of the strongest 
force —  apart from Sukarno himself —  in Indonesian politics. 
This was the army.(9) Since its successful suppression of the 
1958 PRRI-Permesta Rebellion, the army had vastly expanded its 
political position. Fully exploiting the special powers avail­
able to it under martial law, the army entrenched itself in the 
economic administration of the country while at the same time 
adding to its already overwhelming superiority in arms. More 
importantly from the standpoint of Sukarno’s personal position 
and the prospects for his nasakom accommodation, the army showed 
its hostility to the PKI by harassing it whenever the opportun­
ity arose. Although Sukarno's political maneuvers within the 
army gradually weakened the collective resolve of the officer 
corps to crush the PKI, at the end of the Guided Democracy 
period the Army General Staff still opposed nasakom. As the 
most upwardly mobile social group within the Djakarta political 
elite, the army leadership had come to oppose the PKI not merely 
on grounds of its alleged international connections —  the 
reality of which had been proved to many of the older officers 
by the 1948 Madiun Affair —  but also because of the army's own 
vested interests in the spoils of Guided Democracy. In short, 
the army constituted the primary obstacle to the realization of 
Sukarno!s goal of a nationalist, but radical left, nasakom 
Indonesia.
(8) Ibid, pp. 969-977. Also see Pauker, Guy, "Indonesia in
1§6**: Toward a 'People's Democracy?'", in Asian Survey,
Vol. 5, February 1965, pp. 88-97.
(9) See Lev, Daniel S., "Political Role of Array in Indonesia", 
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36, Winter 1963-1964, pp. 349-364.
Understandably Western diplomats dismissed nasakom as 
simply a PKI trojan horse ridden by a communist-leaning and 
romantically naive Sukarno. If nasakom required Sukarno's 
sponsorship of the PKI coupled with maneuvering to weaken the 
army, clearly the West would be the loser. In any coalition 
of Indonesian political fordes, surely the organized, dedi­
cated, and tactically adept PKI would eventually prevail. In 
reply to this standard Western view of mid-summer 1965, Sukarno 
would undoubtedly have said that, without a nasakom reconcili­
ation, both the nation and the society would be ripped asunder.(1°)
Prestige, Distraction, Balance, and Expansionism
Another area where the ideological-psychological factors 
clearly play an important part in presidential foreign policy 
is the series of international conferences with which Indonesia 
has been identified. As the host of the Bandung Conference of 
1955, she made persistent efforts to establish a second Asian- 
African (AA) Conference. -Dating back to 1956, these initia­
tives had some connection with her desire to rally organized 
support for her claims to West Irian, but the pursuit of status 
constituted an important quest in itself for the proud Sukarno.
And beyond this was the belief that since Indonesia won her in­
dependence through physical struggle and not as a gift from the 
colonial powerv she must pioneer in revolutionizing Malaya, the 
Philippines, and other recipients of counterfeit independence.dD
The presence of ideological-psychological factors in 
Sukarno's motivation would force qualification of popular
(10) For representative discussions of this problem of accom­
modation by Sukarno himself, see his recent Independence 
Day speeches. In particular,■see the one on August 17,
1960, in Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man (Djakarta: 
Department ofForeign Affairs, 1961), pp. 79-118. Also 
see address of August 17, 1964, Departmen Penerangan,
Tahun "Vivere Pericoloso" (A Year of Dangerous Living),
pp. 27-26, 45-^6. the author has also relied here in large 
degree on arguments presented by the world's two leading 
scholars on the role of the PKI under Guided Democracy.
See McVey, Ruth T., "Indonesian Communism and the Transi­
tion to Guided Democracy", in Barnett, A. Doak, ed.,
Communist Strategies in Asia (New York: Praeger University 
Series, 1963), pp. I48-1§0, and Bindley, Donald, The 
Communist Party of Indonesia: 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1964), pp. 275-304.
(11) Kahin, George McT., "Malaysia and Indonesia", Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. 37, Fall 1964, pp. 263-270. Also see, for 
example, Sukarno's ridicule of Malaysia's subservience
to the British in his address of August 17, 1964, op. cit., 
pp. 35-37.
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interpretations about distraction, balance, and expansionism 
in Indonesian foreign policy. Distraction had great currency 
during the West Irian campaign; it became even more common 
during the "Crush Malaysia" struggle. This is the notion 
that the President felt compelled to generate conferences and 
crises in order to distract a population beset by economic 
neglect. As a conscious motive on the part of the President 
such a calculation may have operated. But far more significant 
was his impulsive assertion of personal-national importance. 
Moreover, there is the question of how Sukarno evaluated 
Indonesia's economic ills. He was by his own admission unin­
terested in economic problems. Perhaps as a result of failure 
in this sphere he publicly denied the urgency of economic de­
velopment in the initial phases of nation-building. Consis­
tently, he insisted that the elimination of all foreign in­
fluences —  political, economic, cultural —  must precede full 
attention to domestic economic growth. Finally, whatever the 
President's assessment of Indonesia's economic problems, it 
clearly deviated from that of most Western observers who were 
inclined to see more hardship than was actually felt by 
Indonesians who had endured far worse conditions during the 
Japanese occupation.C12)
Another popular int erpret at ion of the President's foreign 
policy derived from domestic politics. This may be called the 
"balance theory." It pictured Sukarno as determining his do­
mestic and foreign moves in such a way as to keep the army and 
the Communist Party effectively checkmated in their respective 
efforts to augment their power vis-H-yis each other and vis-lt- 
vis the President. Being a shrewd politician, Sukarno must 
have often calculated in this way, but it should not be thought 
of in terms of a rigorous formula. Many moves were apparently 
of a quite different order —  i.e., impulsive, instinctive 
responses to particular problems as they arose. The "balance 
theory" also implied a deference on the President's part to 
other political forces that usually did not operate.
The confrontation with Malaysia provoked charges that 
territorial expansion had also become a major aim of presidential 
policy. One is skeptical of this view, again because of the 
prominence of the ideological-psychological factors evident in 
much of the government propaganda on Malaysia. The case for 
territorial expansion would have been more convincing if there 
had been contemporary evidence of Indonesian leaders laying 
claim to the Borneo territories of Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei. 
There was, in any case, no preparation in the government 12
(12) For Sukarno's view on the role of economic development in 
nation-building, see his speech before the October 196*4 
Cairo Conference, Department of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta, 
196**, "The Era of Confrontation," p. 20.
propaganda for the eventuality of Indonesian seizure and occupation, 
of those areas. This, of course, does not deny the possibility 
that this was Sukarno's aim. What was more likely, however, 
was Indonesian "expansionism" in the sense of creating a sphere 
of influence. Djakarta was determined to expel all imperialist 
influence from Southeast Asia —  asserting its own influence 
there, especially in insular Southeast Asia and Malaya —  and 
if necessary eventually to contest with China for paramountcy 
of influence.
From Non-Alignment to Confrontation; 1960^1965
As already stressed, President Sukarno was the prime factor 
in determining the emergence of an Indonesian confrontation 
foreign policy in the 1960's. His ascendancy in foreign affairs 
arose, however, only after the advent of Guided Democracy. 
Formally decreed on July 5, 1959, this authoritarian political 
system had actually been in genesis since the collapse of par­
liamentary democracy in early 1957. In the subsequent transi­
tion period the President's political energies were absorbed 
in displacing the relatively moderate, Western-leaning leader­
ship of the liberal period.*13)
During the central government's suppression of the re­
gional rebellions from 1958 to 1961 a new distribution of power 
took shape. Dominant was a coalition of mutually dependent but 
antagonistic partners. The senior partner was the master poli­
tician, the imaginative agitator, the romantic nationalist, 
Sukarno. The junior partner was the status-hungry army, untu­
tored in political ideology and tactics, but loyal to Sukarno 
even as it differed with him on the amount of freedom to be 
allowed the Communist Party. As for the political parties 
which survived under the martial law of the army and the authori­
tarian power of the President, it was the Communist Party that 
weighed most significantly in the political balance. Having 
proven its capacity to mobilize an expanding mass base in the 
1957 provincial elections, the PKI continued its national front 
strategy. By providing the President with the organized mass 
support that he both needed and admired, the PKI hoped to win 
presidential protection from army harassment. In addition, the 
PKI sought the time to discipline its still largely unpoliticized 
following in the villages. At the same time identification with 
Sukarno could in time assist the PKI in winning the legitimacy
(13) In addition to the works cited in footnote 2, a detailed 
discussion of the liberal period can be found in Feith, 
Herbert, The Decline ofConstitutional Democracy in 
Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1362).
which it lost in the 19H8 Medium Rebellion.
Preoccupied with consolidating his own political power and 
erecting the institutions of Guided Democracy, President Sukarno 
had little opportunity to follow his predilections for a vig­
orous conf ront at ion foreign policy until the late summer of 
1960. At that juncture Sukarno simultaneously intensified pres­
sure for the recovery of West Irian and moved to establish 
Indonesia as an Asian-African leader. This initial phase of 
confrontation ended with the settlement of the Irian issue in 
August 1962. There followed a year of hesitation that nearly 
saw Indonesia restrain her budding confrontation policy for 
internal economic development. But with the collapse in Septem­
ber 1963 of the Manila Agreements which Sukarno had signed with 
Malaya and the Philippines in August, Indonesia adopted a policy 
of all-out confrontation not only toward Malaysia but toward 
the International Olympic Committee, the United Nations, and 
other manifestations of what Sukarno viewed as Western domina­
tion of the new nations. Congruent with this policy, the 
concept of the new emerging forces became the hallmark of 
Indonesia's confrontation policy.
Policy of Confrontation Phase One:
August" 1160 - August 1962
By the late summer of 1960, it has been noted, President 
Sukarno had sufficiently consolidated his political power to 
permit increased attention to the external aspects of his 
nation-building endeavors. Failing to win army backing, the 
last organized political opposition to Guided Democracy had 
ended with the banning of its leading sponsors —  the large, 
modernist Islamic Masjumi Party and the small, intellectual 
Socialist Party. Then early in September the President success­
fully withstood a threatened challenge to his encouragement of 
the PKI from a number of regional military commanders. Meanwhile, 
the army had further reduced the numbers of remaining rebels to 
the point where a year later their leaders would surrender them­
selves. While intense political maneuvering continued among 
the three principal political forces —  the President, the army, 
and the rising PKI —  Indonesia had achieved a greater measure 
of political stability than at any time since the early 1950's.
It was in this context of growing political stability at 
home that President Sukarno made the first serious attempts to 
launch what would by 1965 become a policy of full "confrontation" *15
(1*0 See Feith in "Dynamics of Guided Democracy."
(15) For the fullest discussion of domestic political develop­
ment at this stage, consult ibid.
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against imperialism and colonialism. And consistent with that 
later, more ambitious policy President Sukarno concentrated his 
efforts simultaneously on two tasks. One was regional, the 
other virtually world-wide. Priority went at this juncture to 
the regipnal task —  the recovery of West Irian from the Dutch. 
Although a special issue because of the irredentist nature of 
the Indonesian claim, Sukarno repeatedly placed it in the broader 
context of thwarting an imperialist scheme against the Indonesian 
revolution. It is this aspect together with the implicit nation­
alist assertion involved that provides a link between the West 
Irian issue and the Malaysian question. Meanwhile, simultane­
ous with the prosecution of this regional claim, Sukarno ini­
tiated efforts to establish Indonesia as a leader of the emerg­
ing nations. Consistent with the drift toward a policy of 
militant confrontation against nekolim, that quest for leader­
ship steadily shifted its ideologicalbanner from non-alignment 
to an increasingly exclusive emphasis on Asian-African solidar­
ity. It is these developments together with the West Irian 
campaign that characterize the course of Indonesian foreign 
affairs from August 1960 to August 1962. But there was a prior 
condition that had to be satisfied before Indonesia could seri­
ously hope to give credibility to her claims to both West Irian 
and Afro-Asian leadership. This was a modern military capa­
bility.
The Acquisition of a Modern Military Capability: Implications
for Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations
Since the final frustration in 1957 of Indonesia's attempt 
to seek the U.N. General Assembly's support on the West Irian 
issue, Sukarno had understood that he could not recover West 
Irian until he acquired sufficient heavy military equipment to 
back up his demands.*1®' Moreover, in the quest for influence 16
(16) In his Independence Day address on August 17, 1960, Sukarno
described the evolution of Indonesia's policy on the question 
of West Irian in these terms: " . . .  finally, finally, a 
few years ago dawn broke through on our West Irian policy. 
Finally, a couple of years ago, we changed the nature of our 
struggle from 'friendly persuasion of the Dutch' to return 
West Irian to us, it became a policy of confrontation of all 
our national forces with those of the Dutch in the question 
of West Irian. From that moment on, we re-discovered the 
fact that national struggle is a matter of strength, a matter 
of 'formation and utilization of power', a matter of struggle, 
and not at all a matter of 'begging'. That moment was the 
moment of 're-discovery of our Revolution'! Indeed! we are 
no longer begging for talks with the Dutch on the question 
of West Irian: we will continue to carry out the policy of
'other methods' until West Irian is returned to the sover­
eignty of the Republic." Sukarno went on to break diplomatic
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in Southeast Asia and the broader world of Afro-Asian affairs, 
Sukarno felt strongly that Indonesia should have a military 
establishment commensurate with her size and population. Not 
only would this reduce the likelihood of Western intervention, 
but it would make Indonesia more powerful than any of her im­
mediate neighbors —  the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, and 
Australia. Finally, Sukarno craved modern military power as a 
status symbol to impress both his own people and the leaders 
of Afro-Asia.
Although the army leaders shared Sukarno's perception of 
the importance of modern arms to Indonesia’s security and 
prestige, it appears that they differed with him over whether 
the United States or the Soviet Union should supply the arms.(17) 
While the facts are still not clear on the relations between 
the army and Sukarno on this question, it is certain that the 
army made one final plea to Washington for heavy arms in early 
October 1960. Presented by General Abdul Haris Nasution him­
self, this plea was rejected by the Eisenhower Administration.
And thus it was that a somewhat reluctant General Nasution 
journeyed to Moscow in January 1961 to sign an arms purchase 
agreement totaling H50 million dollars.
Sukarno's satisfaction with this agreement clearly went 
beyond the realization of his immediate objective —  to acquire 
a modern military capability sufficient to give support to both 
his claim to West Irian and his quest for Afro-Asian leadership. 
A subsidiary cause for Sukarno's satisfaction lay in the left­
ward thrust the agreement gave both Indonesian politics and 
foreign relations.
Domestically it seemed likely that the Soviets would employ 
their new leverage to assist Sukarno in curbing the army's 
harassment of the PKI —  harassment that had culminated in 17
relations with the Netherlands and announced a "policy for 
the liberation of West Irian in a revolutionary manner./' 
See the English translation of this speech entitled "Like 
an Angel that Strikes from the Skies", in Toward Freedom 
and the Dignity of Man, pp. 108-109.
(17) The army's stance on this question is based primarily on 
remarks made to the author by diplomats on the American 
side.
For a press account of General Nasution's October 1960 
mission to Washington corroborated by diplomatic sources 
on both sides, see The New York Times, October 6 and 7, 
I960. For discussion of tlie Nasution mission to Moscow 
and its implications, see Feith, Herbert, "Indonesia", 
in Kahin, George McT., ed., Governments and Politics of 
Southeast Asia, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University f^ ress, 
1MV), pp. 265-270.
August 1960 with the temporary banning of PKI activities by 
local military commanders in three provinces.(18) Surely the 
diplomatic necessity of not offending the major supplier of 
Indonesian arms would tend to deter the army somewhat -- par­
ticularly when additional arms agreements were regarded as 
essential to West Irian strategy.
Furthermore, although the army would gain in power and 
prestige from the agreement, it was in fact the navy and the 
air force that would receive the warships and jet planes.(19) 
More tractable to Sukarno and Soviet influence than the army, 
these strengthened services could perhaps be used to restrict 
the army's domination of the armed forces. Finally, the reduc­
tion in the relative importance of the United States' influence 
in the Indonesian armed forces was coupled with understandable 
pique among army leaders at the repeated refusal of the United 
States to grant their requests for heavy arms.
It was, however, the context in which the agreement was 
made which gave the greatest boost to Sukarno's leftward ori­
entation at home and abroad. The issue at hand was the highly 
emotional, nationalist claim to West Irian. The public reluc- 189
(18) See Pauker, Guy, "The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia",
Foreign Affairs, Vol. HO, July 1962, pp. 612-626, for an 
exaggerated estimate of the potential Soviet influence in 
the Indonesian army. Moreover, he overlooks the possibil­
ity that the Soviets may have already decided not to press 
in this direction at all. In short, the brewing Sino- 
Soviet dispute may have caused them to bank on the 
Indonesian army rather than the PKI to counter Chinese 
influence in Indonesia. For an account of army harassment 
of the PKI in the summer of 1960, see Feith, Herbert,
"Dynamics of Guided Democracy", pp. 337-339.
(19) Soviet military aid during the West Irian campaign eventual­
ly totalled nearly 1 billion dollars. It included, among 
other items, a 19,000-ton cruiser (later named the West 
Irian), TU-16 long-range bombers, and MIG-19 supersonic 
fighters. See Pauker, "The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia", 
p. 615. Compare with Nation (Sydney, Australia), November 
3, 1962. Because of the highly sophisticated character of 
the arms received, the navy and air force became heavily 
dependent on the Soviet Union for initial training of men 
to operate and maintain the equipment. Subsequently, the 
need for highly specialized repairs served to maintain Soviet 
influence in these two forces. In contrast, the army received 
much less sophisticated equipment from the Soviets. Moreover, 
the United States continued to deliver small anus to the army 
and train many of its officers. For estimates of Indonesian 
naval and air strength in 1962, see The New York Times, 
November 11, 1962.
tance of the United States to assist Indonesia either diplomat­
ically or by selling her heavy arms became dramatically jux­
taposed with the Soviet Union's vociferous diplomatic support 
and her generous military aid. As it came in the wake of the 
Khrushchev visit of a year before with its 250 million dollars 
in economic aid, the image of both the Soviet Union and com­
munism generally had never appeared more attractive to the 
Indonesian political public.T2 0 )
Ironically from the Soviet standpoint, the enhanced stature 
of communism arising from Russian arms aid may well have facil­
itated Sukarno's effort to restore close relations with China.(21) 
From early 1959 into the summer of 1960 Sino-Indonesian rela­
tions had deteriorated under the impact of the army-backed 
persecution of Chinese in West Java. Then in the fall of I960 
the way opened to a rapprochement. This was due in part to 
Chinese recognition of Sukarno's efforts to stop the persecu­
tions. The primary factor, however, was the decision by Peking 
to sacrifice its standing with overseas Chinese for the higher 
priority of cultivating Sukarno as an ally. Both Sukarno and 
Peking by early 1961 had apparently recognized their respective 
interests in collaborating to propagate a militant anti*imper- 
ialism among Afro-Asian nations. Symbolized by the visits of 
Chen Yi to Djakarta in April 1961 and of Sukarno to Peking in 
June, this budding collaboration immediately gave pause to the 
already concerned Soviets and Americans. 201
(20) As Feith and others have properly cautioned, the shift to
the left is easy to exaggerate. In addition to the role 
the United States was to play in the West Irian dispute, 
she still retained far more leverage on Indonesia than 
the Soviets and the Chinese combined. Apart from the 
presence of the Seventh Fleet in the nearby South China 
Sea, the U.S. military and economic aid (including badly 
needed rice shipments under the Pm80 program) continued at 
a rate of approximately 50 million dollars for fiscal year 
1961. Indonesia's trade remained centered on the West and 
Japan, while anti-communist sentiment was still dominant 
among the government elite with its heavy military compon­
ent. Finally, Sukarno's own ideological hostility to 
America seemed susceptible to softening in 1961 with the 
coming to power of the highly popular President Kennedy, and 
the continuing exertions of American Ambassador Howard P. 
Jones, for whom Sukarno has often shown high personal 
regard. Compare Brackman, Arnold, Indonesian Communism 
(New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 264-3WI . ...
(21) The irony arises from the likelihood that Soviet economic 
and military aid was at least in part directed at countering 
China's expansion of influence in Indonesia. For this 
point and other matters related to Sino-Indonesian relations 
in the 1959-1961 period as well as subsequently, see 
Mozingo, op. cit.
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In the spring of 1961, however, the chief item on Sukarno's 
agenda was not the promising new relationship with China. It 
was the recovery of West Irian, and for this task the combina­
tion of Soviet arms and American diplomatic support were the 
most important instruments. Not until 1963 with the opening 
of a new phase of Indonesia's confrontation foreign policy 
would Peking and Djakarta develop the intimacy that would lead 
to what by the summer of 1965 Sukarno would term an axis 
relationship.(22)
The Recovery of West Irian(23)
The final stage in Indonesia's multifaceted campaign to 
recover West Irian commenced on December 19, 1961, when Presi­
dent Sukarno delivered his widely heralded "Trikora" command 
to the nation to prepare for mobilization. Shortly thereafter 
he promised that Irian would return to Indonesia before the end 
of 1962. These dramatic announcements served to generate the 
emotions of his people to a new intensity. But in addition, 
Sukarno clearly sought to demonstrate to the outside world his 
determination to use the arms just received from the Russians —  
if necessary. This implicit warning was greeted with some 
initial scoffing abroad, but it proved to be a well-timed 
maneuver for reaching his chief targets —  the Dutch and the 
Americans.
As the stubborn opponents of the Indonesians during the 
12 years of the dispute over West Irian, the Dutch would not be 
budged easily from their refusal to transfer the area to 
Djakarta. For 11 years they had successfully resisted all ef­
forts —  bilateral and multilateral via the United Nations —  
even to negotiate. Now in the fall of 1961 they were, however, 
in a desperate position. Ironically, they had come to this point 
in the wake of their most imaginative and attractive stratagem of 
the entire decade of the dispute.(2**) This was the Luns Plan 23
(22) See subsequent discussion.
(23) A review of the history of the West Irian dispute up to 
1958 can be found in Bone, Robert, The Dynamics of the 
Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) ProElem (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Modern Indonesia Project, 1958) and Van der 
Kroef, J. M., The West New Guinea Dispute (New York: In­
stitute of Pacific delations, 135^ 1). For the subsequent 
period, see Brackman, op. cit., pp. 26*t-306.
(2*0 For the official Indonesian reaction to the Luns Plan,
see the speech of Foreign Minister Subandrio in the General 
Debate of the General Assembly on October 9, 1961. De­
partment of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta, 1961, Statement 
on West Irian, pp. 13-23.
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which called for the transfer of West Irian to U.N. trusteeship 
with the eventual goal of granting independence to the Papuans 
who had just started on the path of self-government with Dutch 
coaching. But this plan met defeat in the U.N. General Assembly 
in the fall of 1961. Accordingly, in the wake of Trikora the 
Dutch faced the equally unpalatable alternatives of risking war 
with Sukarno or negotiating with him. Negotiations would in­
evitably involve not only their exit from West Irian —  which 
they were prepared to accept —  but the discussion of the 
Indonesian demand for transfer of the area to Indonesia. Indeed, 
Sukarno insisted that the Dutch must agree to the principle of 
transfer as a precondition for holding talks.
Recalling the diplomacy of the Indonesian revolution which 
invoked the assistance of the United Nations and the United 
States, Sukarno recognized that the Dutch could not be moved, 
into negotiations without pressure from friends —  pressure to 
soften the humiliation of succumbing to a man detested by the 
Dutch and backed by international communist arms and propaganda. 
The Trikora speech —  though certainly not the sole factor —  
produced a predictable response from both the United Nations and 
the United States. In fact, U Thant and President Kennedy issued 
virtually identical appeals to the Dutch and the Indonesians to 
forego force and seek a negotiated solution in the interests 
of world peace.
What Indonesia had failed to achieve in years of diplomatic 
effort in the United Nations and in Washington suddenly came to 
be. The moral authority of the United Nations was at last pub­
licly behind a negotiated solution that the General Assembly 
had refused to endorse on several occasions. More important, 
the powerful United States had at last begun to move from passive 
neutrality toward active mediation. To both the Indonesians 
and the Dutch this shift of attitude was tantamount to a shift 
from the Dutch to the Indonesian side. Just as passive neutrality’ 
meant tacit support for the status quo, so active mediation was 
tacit support for a change —  a change that could only benefit 
the Indonesian position. In short, in the wake of Trikora —  
not solely because of it, however —  the Indonesians had success­
fully restructured the international context of the dispute to 
their distinct advantage.
The shift in the American position testifies further to the 
shrewdness and the boldness of Indonesia's diplomatic strategy. 
From the perspective of their revolution, the Indonesians had 
come to realize that America's professed support for the aspira­
tions of newly emerging nations would not in itself cause her to 
oppose a close NATO ally, such as the Netherlands. Moreover, 
the American intervention in the rebellion of 1958 had reinforced 
substantially suspicion of the U.S. attitude towards Sukarno's 
Guided Democracy. While there had been something of a rapproche­
ment since that low point in relations, suspicion lingered.
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Washington's refusal to sell Indonesia the arms she needed to 
apply pressure on the Dutch underscored the conviction that 
America herself must be pressured before she would assist Indo­
nesia on the Irian issue. Just as cold war considerations in­
fluenced the United States to intervene in the years 19*t9 and 
1958, so this would be the lever in 1961-1962. Certainly orie 
major intended effect of the purchase of arms from the Soviets 
was to awaken American fears of expanded communist influence.
The Trikora speech presented the further disturbing possibility 
of a war between Indonesia and the Netherlands. As President 
Kennedy made clear, the American interest lay in preventing such 
a conflict.(25) Not only could it involve the cold war antago­
nists in a dangerous confrontation, but it would at the very 
least greatly enhance the influence of communism in Indonesian 
domestic and foreign affairs. Such were the fears that Indonesia 
calculated —  apparently correctly —  would be decisive in en­
listing American intervention in the Irian dispute.
Another factor that contributed to the Indonesian pressures 
on Washington was the Kennedy Administration's ardent attempt 
to develop a relationship of mutual trust with President Sukarno. 
This attempt seemed to progress in the meeting between Sukarno 
and Kennedy in April 1961. More important, Washington demon­
strated its good will by promising to send an economic survey 
mission to Indonesia. Both sides apparently interpreted this as 
a tacit promise that America would expand her aid program —  
provided the West Irian dispute was settled peacefully. In 
retrospect, this tacit promise may have acted more as a lever 
on the American position than on the Indonesian position. The 
deepening American resolve to encourage Indonesia on the path of 
political stability and economic development appears to have led 
to some wishful thinking in Washington.v26)
In any case, the expectation arose in the United States —  
and among many Indonesian diplomats and politicians as well —  
that President Sukarno would settle down to economic problems 
once Irian was recovered. To what extent the fostering of that 
expectation was a conscious part of the Indonesian approach to 
Washington is unclear. What is clear is that such an expectation 
contributed to the shift in the American stance on West Irian.
It is evident, however, that it did not weigh as heavily as the 
cold war fears engendered by the Indonesian strategy. 256
(25) See description of U.S. position in The New York Times, 
December 20 and 27, 1961.
(26) This is, of course, a matter of interpretation. But with 
the benefit of hindsight, a number of American officials 
are willing to concede that there was, indeed, some wishful 
thinking in the U.S. expectation that Sukarno would con­
centrate on domestic affairs after the Irian settlement.
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The achieving of a realignment of the diplomatic position 
of the Americans —  not to mention the Dutch and the United 
Nations —  did not, however, make the realization of Sukarnb's 
demands inevitable. But the basic pattern of pressures -- 
direct and .indirect —  military and diplomatic —  that had 
effected the breakthrough were intensified in succeeding months 
to finally win the virtually complete capitulation of the Dutch. 
Following Trikora, military pressure mounted with the stepping 
up of Indonesian infiltration into Irian. Significantly, as 
distasteful as such tactics were to both U Thant and t.ie State 
Department, neither backed Dutch demands that attacks cease dur­
ing negotiations. Rather they intensified exertions to arrange 
and expedite negotiations. U Thant's personal pleas, the Robert 
Kennedy mission, and then the skilled mediation of the State 
Department's Ellsworth Bunker all contributed to the final 
settlement. Concurrently, however, Sukarno maintained his pres­
sures. Risking provocation of the Dutch and disillusionment of 
the Americans, he permitted parachute landings in Irian in 
April 1962. Whatever the risks in such measures, they served 
to sustain the credibility of Indonesia's readiness to liberate 
Irian by force —  if the negotiations collapsed.(27) finally, 
during the concluding stage of the negotiations at the end of 
July, Indonesia actually moved her forces into position for in­
vasion. At this point the President faced the ultimate decision 
of war or peace. While the military leaders did not advocate 
the war alternative, they were prepared to risk costly losses.'28) 
Moreover, a tremendous psychological momentum had been generated 
by the long mobilization process. Many of the field commanders 
were more than ready, they were itchy for the chance to pounce. 
Meanwhile, Washington strongly urged restraint, while Moscow 278
(27) One high ranking Dutch diplomat who was deeply involved in 
the West Irian question in 1962 has assured the author that 
the Dutch believed that Sukarno was not bluffing - i.e., 
that he would use force if negotiations did not bear fruit. 
The same source asserted that high American officials —  
including Robert Kennedy —  were similarly convinced of 
Sukarno's determination to use force if necessary. This
is consistent with the author's own impression of the 
American estimate of Sukarno's intentions.
(28) The attitude of the military leadership at this juncture
is still a matter of controversy. Moreover, it seems likely 
that the leadership was not entirely united on which was 
the preferred solution from the standpoint of the army's 
political position. Whatever these differences there is 
no question that the army would have responded energetically 
to a presidential order to attack. For one view of the 
evolution of the army views on West Irian, see Feith, 
"Dynamics of Guided Democracy", pp. 363-364.
reportedly pressed for an invasion.(29 30) Ultimately Sukarno 
accepted the highly favorable terms negotiated by Malik and 
Subandrio in Washington.(30) In doing so he demonstrated his 
craft in nconfrontation" diplomacy —  a mix of bold, cunning, 
and sometimes unpredictable maneuvers —  and achieved for him­
self and the diplomats the glory that might have been reserved 
to the military if war had occurred.
First Departures from Non-Alignment
Simultaneous with his bold prosecution of the West Irian 
campaign, President Sukarno opened his related effort to estab­
lish Indonesia as a leader of the emergent nations. Choosing 
the dramatic occasion of the gathering of chiefs of state at 
the United Nations in September 1960, Sukarno appealed to the 
new nations to join in a crusade "to build the world anew" —  
a world in which the emerging countries would attain the self- 
respect of an equal share in both the councils and the riches 
of the world. Such a utopia could, however, be attained only 
by a relentless struggle —  a confrontation —  against all the 
bulwarks of power controlled by the capitalist nations of the 
West. The dialectic process of history demanded that this con­
test be arduous, but it also guaranteed ultimate victory to the 
new nations. Here, then, was the core of the "confrontation"
(29) President Kennedy is said to have issued a very firm warning 
to Subandrio at their meeting on July 26 not to resort to 
force but to settle for the considerable concessions the 
Dutch had already made. In that this report has been cor­
roborated by a reliable Dutch source, the author is inclined 
to accept it. Generally, of course, the Dutch were very 
irritated by the manner in which.the United States had 
allegedly "sprung" the Bunker Plan on them.
For the Russians' reported pressure on the Indonesians, see 
the account of Anastas Mikoyan's visit to Djakarta in late 
July in Brackman, op. cit., p. 298. For reference to earlier 
Russian displeasure withthe American-sponsored path of 
negotiation, see Pauker, "The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia", 
p. 613.
(30) Both American and Indonesian officials have emphasized to 
the author how close Indonesia came tc launching an invasion 
of Irian on the very eve of the August ISth settlement.
This final crisis point in the long negotiations centered 
on the "flag issue" —  i.e., at what point the Dutch flag 
should be lowered and the Indonesian raised. The American 
mediator, Bunker, is credited with the ingenious formula 
that settled this issue. See The New York Times, August. 10- 
17, 1962. An earlier critical period in the negotiations 
arose over Dutch resistance to Indonesia's escalation of her 
demands in the last week of July. See ibid., July 27 and 
August 1, 1962.
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policy that had always been central in Sukarno's thinking and 
emotions.(31)
Inseparable from this militant anti-imperialist crusade 
was another facet of Sukarno's nationalism —  the personal cum 
national quest for the prestige and status of leadership of the 
new nations. Manifest in Sukarno's claim that Indonesia's ex­
perience in nation-building was worthy of study by other nations, 
this ambition was even more strikingly revealed in Sukarno's 
proposal that the Indonesian national credo (the Pantjasila) be 
incorporated into the U.N. Charter.
As prominent as were the anti-imperialist and national 
ambitions themes in Sukarno's U.N. address, the speech is also 
notable for its attention to the typical concerns of non-align­
ment which by the fall of 196H Sukarno had largely repudiated.
In September 1960, however, when he spoke to the General Assembly, 
the recent collapse of the Paris meeting between Eisenhower and 
Khrushchev had made the cold war a pressing matter even for a 
leader preoccupied with the threat of imperialism. Arguing the 
"vital importance" of disarmament, Sukarno vigorously condemned 
nuclear testing. Moreover, he personally joined four other non- 
aligned leaders in formally proposing that Khrushchev and Eisen­
hower resume their talks. Even more notable given his forceful 
appeal for an anti-imperialist crusade, Sukarno described the 
contemporary world as divided into three camps —  the two cold 
war blocs and the non-aligned, the nations of Asia and Africa.
A year later, it should be observed, Sukarno had already amended 
this view so heavily influenced by the cold war situation.
During 1961 the President's preoccupation with advancing 
his anti-imperialist campaign took increasing precedence over 
his role as non-aligned mediator of the cold war. This was most 
evident in his promotion of a second AA Conference. Too often 31
(31) For Sukarno's speech to the United Nations, see "To Build 
the World Anew" in Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man, 
pp. 119-1H9. For comparison with Sukarno's earlier 
speeches see his June 1, 19H5, "The Birth of Pantja Sila", 
his May 17, 1956, speech to the U.S. Congress, and his 
August 17, 1959, "Political Manifesto" in ibid. For his 
pre-revolution speeches, see particularly Departmen 
Penerangan, Penerbitan Chusus No. 168, "Indonesia Menggugat" 
(Indonesia Accuses). This was Sukarno's speech in 
December 1930 before the Dutch court trying him for 
political subversion.
For commentary on and selections from Sukarno's foreign 
policy ideology during the Guided Democracy period, see 
Modelski, George, ed., The New Emerging Forces; Documents 
on the Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy (Canberra: 
Australian National University, 1965).
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seen as only another diplomatic means of strengthening his pro­
paganda position on West Irian, this effort basically derived 
from a much broader and highly personal concern to advance both 
the anti-imperialist crusade and the role of Indonesia in the 
AA world.
In a pattern of response that would repeat itself three 
years later, only the People's Republic of China evinced enthu­
siasm for Indonesia's proposal. The dominant Asian-African 
feeling was expressed by the still highly respected Jawaharlal 
Nehru and the influential Gamal Abdel Nasser. They not only 
questioned the urgency of Sukarno's anti-imperialism, but they 
warned that conflicts among Asian-African nations might disrupt 
a regional conference. To Sukarno's personal disappointment his 
proposal not only failed to win support, but his two potential 
rivals for AA leadership joined with Yugoslavia to launch a 
Conference of Non-Aligned Nations.'32) Although partly appeased 
by the vague promise of a second AA Conference later and the 
prestige of co-sponsoring the non-aligned conference, Sukarno 
persisted in his ideological dissent from the Nehru-Tito-Nasser 
stress on the urgency of the non-aligned nations mediating the 
cold war. What was still only implicit in his "To Build the 
World Anew" address a year earlier now became plain in his 
address to the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in 
September 1961.
Speaking on the day after the announcement by Moscow of its 
unilateral resumption of nuclear testing, Sukarno demonstrated 
his waning sense of concern about the role of non-aligned nations 
in mediating between the cold war antagonists.<33) Consistent 
with the definition of non-alignment that Indonesia had success­
fully pressed for at the preparatory meeting for the Belgrade 
Conference, Sukarno's stress was on the necessity of combatting 
imperialism, colonialism, and their more subtle manifestations 
in post-independence societies, neo-colonialism. That combat
(32) The apparent failure of Sukarno's efforts to rally support 
for a second Bandung Conference in the spring of 1961 emerges 
from a study of Indonesian press reports on the mission of 
Deputy Foreign Minister Supeni to six Asian-African countries. 
See particularly dispatches in Indonesian News Agency PIA
for February 10, March 21, April 1, and May 8. For compari­
son see the official Indonesian version of the genesis of 
the Belgrade Conference, Department of Foreign Affairs, 
Djakarta, 1961, "Indonesia and the Conference of Non-Aligned 
Countries", p. 5.
(33) For Sukarno's speech before the Belgrade Conference, see 
Department of Information, Special Issue 1961, No. 80,
"From Non-Alignment to Coordinated Accumulation of Moral 
Force Toward Friendship, Peace and Social Justice Among 
Nations."
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deserved priority, for it was these evil forces, not the cold 
war, that constituted the most urgent threat to world peace.
Such a position did not as yet involve a complete repudia­
tion of the non-aligned powers' customary preoccupation with 
active mediation of cold war disputes. Indeed, Sukarno himself 
served as one of the conference's emissaries to Washington to 
present a plea for peace. But the emphasis in Sukarno's speech 
became the guideline for Indonesia's adamant fight with India 
in the conference drafting committee over whether the priority 
should be given to Nehru's call for mediation in the cause of 
world peace or Sukarno's call for an intensification of the 
crusade against imperialism in the interests of a new world.
As had already become clear from the differing positions of 
Indonesia and India on the Congo issue, Indonesia was moving 
toward a position of militant confrontation.(3*0
In retrospect, Djakarta's political leaders and diplomats 
invariably point to this Belgrade Conference as a milestone in 
the development of Indonesia's foreign policy under Guided 
Democracy. This is in part because it was in his airport speech 
on returning home from Belgrade that the President first coined 
his now familiar expression, "the new emerging forces," to des­
cribe the "emerging forces" discussed in his Belgrade~speech, i.e, 
the developing nations, the socialist nations, and the progres­
sive elements in the established nations. In a dialectical 
struggle predeterminedby history itwas thetask of these new 
emerging forces to destroy the "old established forces" of im­
perialism and colonialism in a crusade to build the world anew .05) 
The world was n o w —  as in fact it had always been in Sukarno's 
emotions —  a world divided into these two hostile camps. The 
resulting impact on Indonesia's foreign relations would be 
enormous.
Policy of Confrontation Phase Two:
““ — ‘TS3X T9E? "T^ujgjiTiaCg— —
The Watersheds August 1962 - September 1963
From the vantage point of mid-1965, the year August 1962 
through September 1963 marks a watershed in Indonesian foreign 345
(34) For a penetrating discussion of the divergent approaches of
non-aligned countries to the Congo issue in 1961, see Good, 
Robert, "The Congo Crisis: A Study of Post-Colonial
Politics" in Martin, Lawrence, ed., Neutralism and Non- 
Alignment (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 34-6$.
(35) See Sukarno speech to the Belgrade Conference, op. cit♦
For the fullest elaboration of the concept of the new 
emerging forces, see Department of Foreign Affairs, 
Djakarta, 1965, "New Forces Build A New World."
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p o l i c y . T h i s  is so because after the settlement of the 
Irian issue in mid-August 1962 Indonesia was freer than at any 
point in her short history to choose between domestic economic 
development and a bold foreign policy. In practice President 
Sukarno seems to have rather vacillated between the mutually 
exclusive alternatives before making his choice for the latter 
in September 1963.
The reasons behind this crucial decision reveal the dyna­
mics of Indonesia's policy. Central was Sukarno's frank dis­
interest in the undramatic problems of economics. Even as he 
gave his blessing to a Western stabilization program in the 
spring of 1963, he withheld his full backing. And before the 
program's initial regulations had been given sufficient time 
to work, his disinterest grew. It turned to open disenchant­
ment when the PKI mounted a fierce attack on the regulations.
In contrast to his disinterest in economics, Sukarno must 
have been positively attracted by the opportunity he faced in 
the foreign policy sphere. With West Irian and domestic rebel­
lions settled, Indonesia was able to pursue the daring course 
in international affairs dictated by the President's anti-im­
perialism. Not only was she relatively free of domestic inhibi­
tions, but she now possessed a military establishment that com­
manded the respect of her smaller neighbors, including Australia 
Moreover, the gradual fragmentation of the cold war blocs had 
begun to usher in a phase of realignment in international poli­
tics that at once made non-alignment irrelevant and offered 
opportunity to a country aspiring to the status of a world power 
Such was the chance that Sukarno saw both in opposing Malaysia 
and in defying the International Olympic Committee by organizing 
the Games of the New Emerging Forces*
Dispute Over Malaysia
The origins of Indonesia's confrontation with the Federa­
tion of Malaysia remain uncertain.(37) what is definite is that 367
(36) The case for the summer of 1962 as a turning point in
Indonesian domestic politics, as well as in foreign af­
fairs, has been made in Feith, "President Sukarno, the 
Army, and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape."
(37) The Malaysian dispute has been the subject of increasing
scrutiny from all sides. For three of the more recent 
attempts by Western scholars, see Hindley, Donald, "Indo­
nesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives"
Asian Survey, Vol. H, June 196H, pp. 90»*-913; Kahin, 
''Malaysia and Indonesia"; and Curtis, Robert, "Malaysia 
and Indonesia", New Left Review, No. 28, November -December 
196H. For the views of the Indonesian and Malaysian
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Indonesia's strident propaganda against the formation of Malay­
sia arose only after the Brunei revolt of December 8, 1962. 
Although Djakarta did extend some covert aid to the rebels 
prior to the revolt* it is conceded even by the Malaysians that 
Indonesia did not instigate the rebellion.t38) Indonesia did* 
however, use the fact of the revolt as the basis for the charge 
that the planned federation did not command popular support in 
Brunei or in the British Borneo territories of Sabah and Sarawak. 
Moreover* she extended prompt moral* political* and eventually 
military support to rebel leader A. M. Azahari's self-proclaimed 
state Of Kalimantan Utara which sought to embrace Brunei and the 
two British Borneo territories as well.
During the spring of 1963* simultaneous with the intensi­
fication of Indonesia's multifaceted effort to frustrate the 
formation of Malaysia* negotiations began among Malayan* Indo­
nesian* and Philippine diplomats in Manila to seek a formula 
under which Indonesia and the Philippines could accept Malaysia. 
(The Philippines at this time echoed some of Indonesia's objec­
tions to the planned federation as part of her effort to win 
attention to her claim to much of Sabah.) Subministerial talks 
in April cleared the way for the surprisingly amicable meeting 
between Sukarno and the Tunku in Tokyo on June 1. There quickly 
followed a foreign ministers' gathering that set the stage for 
the climatic summer meeting of Sukarno* the Tunku* and Macapagal 
in Manila from July 31 through August 5.
The Manila Conference produced the long-sought formula 
under which Indonesia and the Philippines could accept the 
formation of Malaysia without losing face. The two powers 
asserted that they would welcome Malaysia if "the support of 
the people of the Borneo territories" is verified by an "inde­
pendent and impartial authority"* the U.N. Secretary-General 
or his representative. Consistent with this general commit­
ment , the three governments requested that U Thant appoint 
working teams to carry out such an ascertainment. 38
governments, there are a number of official publications. 
Among others, see Government of the Republic of Indonesia* 
Why Indonesia Opposes British-Made 'Malaysia' (Djakarta: 
September 156*0 and I'ederation of Malaysia, Malaya Indo­
nesian Relations (Kuala Lumpur: 1963). Also see Department 
of Information, Government of Malaysia* Malaysia in Afro- 
Asia (November 196*0. Much of the discussion thatfollows 
is, however* based on the author's conversations with dip­
lomats in Djakarta during 196**-1965 and in Kuala Lumpur 
during a brief visit in June 1965.
(38) See Kahin* "Malaysia and Indonesia." But Kahin and others 
make the further point that the revolt derived from inter­
nal political discontent. The Malaysian case for pre-Brunei 
Indonesian planning to subvert Malaysia is set forth in 
Government of the Federation of Malaysia* Indonesian Inten­
tions Toward Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: April 196*0.
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In addition to this accord on Malaysia, the three nations 
agreed to give concrete form to President Macapagal's proposal 
for a Maphilindo, a loose organization of the three Malay na­
tions. At the time Maphilindo seemed a happy compromise of 
Western And Indonesian concepts of Southeast Asian security.'33'
On one hand, Sukarno won recognition from the Tunku and 
Macapagal that their Western bases were "temporary in nature" 
and that regional security rested primarily with the govern­
ments and the peoples of the countries directly concerned. On 
the, other hand, the Tunku, Macapagal, and many Americans felt 
that Maphilindo*s chief security responsibility was to frustrate 
Chinese expansionism.
Finally, and perhaps most important, Sukarno's acceptance 
of the Manila Agreements seemed to indicate his preference for 
a peaceful extension of his influence in Southeast Asia within 
a Maphilindo framework rather than an aggressive pursuit of in­
fluence by means of confrontation. This preference would in turn 
favor the conditions necessary for the success of the American- 
sponsored economic stabilization program.
Despite these hopeful possibilities for channeling Indonesia's 
virulent nationalism into more temperate pursuits, the British 
viewed the Manila Agreements with both scepticism and irrita­
tion.'1* 3' They rather felt that both the Malayans and the 
Americans had been taken in by Indonesian charm and craft. More­
over, as the sovereign power in Sabah and Sarawak, they resented 
the Tunku's effort to conciliate Sukarno by agreeing to 1  U.N. 
opinion survey in their territories —  especially since this 
implied that the survey and legislative elections held under 
their supervision had been biased. Accordingly, it is not sur­
prising that arguments occurred between the British and the 
Americans about a conciliatory approach towards Sukarno during 
the implementation of the accord on the U.N. opinion survey. 
Forcefully represented in the person of the Colonial Secretary, 
Duncan Sandys, British policy insisted on fulfilling no more than 
the letter of the Manila Agreements. And because of this London 
has provided at least some ground for Indonesian charges that 
British provocations prevented the proper carrying out of the 39
(39) For a discussion of a prevalent trend in official Indonesian 
thinking in 1963-196H on the possibility of Maphilindo's 
serving as a compromise of Western and Indonesian security 
interests, see Bey, Arifin, "A Second Look at Southeast 
Asia" (Speech to American Men's Association in Djakarta, 
August 25, 196it). Also see Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia."
(HO) For a summary of Anglo-American differences over the 
Malaysian dispute during the period up to early 196*t, 
see Leifer, Michael, "Anglo-American Differences over 




Whatever the reasons, the Indonesians in the end refused 
to accept U Thant's finding that Malaysia did command popular 
support in the two Borneo territories. The ensuing bitterness 
engendered between Djakarta on one hand and Kuala Lumpur and 
London on the other found its most dramatic expression in the 
burning of the British embassy and British homes in Djakarta. 
There followed Sukarno's decision to break economic relations 
with the now formed Federation of Malaysia. This extreme step 
wrecked the last hopes for the American economic stabilization 
program. Washington announced that it would abandon its effort 
to organize a European aid consortium to back the stabilization 
plan. Still exhibiting restraint, America did not, however, 
follow British wishes that she terminate her aid program in 
Indonesia.
Behind this evidence of restraint in Washington was the 
continuing hope that it could retain sufficient leverage on 
Sukarno to coax him back to the conference table. (**2) As in 
the period immediately following the Manila summit, the United 
States again sought to play a role reminiscent of her stance 
in the later stages of the West Irian problem. Encouraged by 
the Indonesians to play this quasi-mediator part, the United 
States actively backed Thai and Philippine mediation attempts, *
(HI) The most serious of the alleged British provocations con­
cerns the announcement by the Malayan government on August
29 that Malaysia would be formed on September 16 irrespec­
tive of the findings of the U.N. survey mission. Although 
British and Malaysian diplomats are sometimes willing to 
concede that this pre-announcement was a tactical error, 
they stress the compelling legal and domestic political 
considerations that influenced the Malayan cabinet to de­
cide to make such an announcement. Moreover, a special 
Malayan mission went to Djakarta before making it public 
to explain the reasons to Foreign Minister Subandrio. 
Malayans claim that Subandrio voiced no objections during 
his meeting with the mission. Finally, Sukarno's opponents 
stress that whatever the impact of this and other British 
provocations it was not decisive in motivating Indonesia to 
reject the U.N. findings. In fact, they argue, the opposi­
tion to Malaysia in military terms was continuing through­
out the period of negotiations. For an example of this lat­
ter view, presented by an informed Australian journalist, 
see Grant, Bruce, Indonesia (Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 19610, pp. 141-145.
(42) This interpretation of America's role is based on comments 
made to the author by both American and other Western 
diplomats in Djakarta during 1964 and in Kuala Lumpur 
during a brief visit in June 1965.
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and in January 1964 sent Robert Kennedy to confer with all the 
interested parties. Eventually, despite persistent British- 
Halaysian distrust of Sukarno, ministerial talks took place in 
February and again in March in Bangkok. Although these only 
served to confirm the Tunku's suspicions of Indonesian aims 
and tactics, he finally compromised his insistent demand that 
Indonesian guerrillas completely withdraw from Malaysian terri­
tory prior to the opening of negotiations.
The Tunku's concession on this critical point prepared the 
way for the meeting between the three Maphilindo leaders in 
Tokyo on June 21. Only President Macapagal's personal inter­
vention salvaged an agreement in principle to refer the dispute * 
to a four-nation Afro-Asian commission. President Sukarno ap­
peared to go a step further than the Tunku by pledging also to 
accept the findings of the still unselected commission. The 
Tunku, on the other hand, agreed in principle to the commission 
proposal with the condition that all hostilities against 
Malaysia stop forthwith.(43)
During the 12 months following the abortive Tokyo summit, 
the most significant development in the dispute was Indonesia's 
decision in' mid-August 1964 to extend her guerrilla attacks 
from the Borneo territories to the Malayan peninsula. This 
decision altered both the military and political terns of the 
dispute.
Militarily this Indonesian action generated a further 
buildup of British military, naval, and air forces in the de­
fense of Malaysia. The perceptible escalation by both sides 
moreover, greatly increased the possibility of a British retali­
atory attack on Indonesia. This risk persisted in spite of the 
fact that none of the Indonesian landings on the peninsula 
succeeded. In addition to the increased British commitment 
to Malaysia's defense, Australia sent her first combat troops 
to Borneo. Meanwhile, Australia and other Commonwealth coun­
tries —  including India —  stiffened their support for Kuala 
Lumpur in political and sometimes financial terms. Most notable 
of all was the impact on the position of the long neutral United 
States. Even before the first Indonesian landings on the 
Malayan peninsula President Johnson had welcomed the Tunku to 
Washington and promised to sell him some military equipment. 43
(43) The Indonesian government has laid great stress on Sukarno's 
willingness to commit himself to accepting the findings of 
such a commission. Privately some Foreign Office officials 
have suggested Sukarno acted in this regard over the objec­
tions of his advisers. On the other hand, it should not 
be forgotten that with even one supporter on the four- 
nation commission Indonesia would still be able to block 
any unanimous recommendations inimical to her.
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After the landing attempts this formal promise rested on a much 
firmer sympathy for Malaysia than at the time when it was first 
made. (****}
Indonesia sought to offset these shifts in the military 
balance by seeking additional military aid from the Soviet 
Union. While new promises were extracted from Moscow, delivery 
was slow apparently in large part because of disenchantment 
with a nation which had badly defaulted in paying off its exist­
ing de,bts to the U.S.S.R. in both a financial and political 
sense. Although the Chinese were presumably anxious to exploit 
this rift between Indonesia and the Soviet Union, the Chinese 
apparently could not supply the kinds of arms the Indonesians 
required. More importantly, the army was most reluctant to 
make any direct military arrangements with the Chinese that 
would involve their sending any advisers to Indonesia. (**5)
Perhaps of even greater import than the military escalation 
of the conflict were the repercussions in the international 
arena. The mere fact of Indonesia's extending her armed sub­
version to the territory of Malaya proper hurt her cause, for 
even Djakarta formerly recognized Malaya as a sovereign state 
without ever suggesting that her government was deserving of 
subversion by an outside power. In short, the logic of Indo­
nesia's case against the inclusion of the Borneo territories 
in the Federation of Malaysia could not be convincingly stretched 
to justify attacks on Malaya proper.
For a number of nations, the still more damning aspect of 
Indonesia's landings in Malaya was the stand she took before 
the U.N. Security Council in September 1 9 6 4 .(^6 ) There she 456
(44) The evolution of American policy since the Tokyo summit 
was also greatly influenced by the strong anti-American 
character of President Sukarno's Independence Day speech 
of August 17, 1964. For a perceptive analysis of Washing­
ton's view of Indonesia in the late summer and fall of 
1964, see the articles by Bruce Grant reporting from Wash­
ington in The Statesman of New Delhi as well as in other 
newspapers’! In particular, see "Indonesian Challenge to 
U.S. Presence in S.E. Asia", The Statesman, October 19, 
1964.
(45) For reference to the anti-Chinese attitude of the Indo­
nesian army leadership, see Feith, "Indonesia", p. 267.
(46) The author concedes that his view of Afro-Asian reaction 
to the Security Council debate is based primarily on the 
comments of diplomats and newspapers from nations which 
Indonesia would have regarded as unrepresentative of Afro- 
Asian feeling. Also see Department of Foreign Affairs,
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boldly dismissed prevailing standards of international law as 
irrelevant to a situation which Indonesia had chosen to define 
as a conflict between the "new emerging forces" and the "old 
established forces." The fact that the Security Council's two 
African members —  the Ivory Coast and Morocco —  voted against 
Indonesia is some index of the cool reception that the Indonesian 
justification received in the moderate and non-aligned Afro-Asian 
world —  especially in the smaller nations who faced the prospect 
of encroachment by larger neighbors. Equally telling was the 
attitude of Indonesia's recent friend in the Malaysia dispute —  
the Philippines. As President Macapagal's subsequent statements 
indicated, he cooled considerably in his regard for Indonesia's 
policies.(47) Indeed, he manifested some suspicion of her in­
tentions toward his own country. By itself, of course, no 
single episode in a dispute as relatively minor as the Malaysia 
question can have much impact on a broad range of countries.
But the peninsula landings initiated a perceptible feeling of 
distrust of Indonesian aims and methods in the minds of a number 
of nations which had previously held either no attitude on the 
dispute or an attitude of passive acceptance of Indonesia's 
charges of British neo-colonialism in Malaysia. The much more 
dramatic decision i ~ * ’ " " " ” tions in
of Afro-Asian distrust and disapproval of Indonesia's confronta­
tion foreign policy.(48)
The growing alienation of Indonesia from moderate and non- 
aligned nations in the Afro-Asian world accelerated the develop- 478
Djakarta, 1964, "The 'Malaysia' Issue Before the United 
Nations Security Council" for the speeches of the Indo­
nesian spokesman.
(47) The author is indebted to Philippine diplomats for corrobor­
ation of the reported shift in President Macapagal's views. 
See reports of Macapagal'8 stance in the United States in 
The New York Times, October 9, 1964. Among other things 
Macapagal publicly stated that no new negotiations were 
possible on the Malaysia question before Indonesia met
"the minimum condition that the Indonesians who landed on 
the Malaya mainland are withdrawn." Citation is from a 
mimeographed copy of Macapagal's October 7 speech in Wash­
ington .
(48) Djakarta's own press is the best proof of the unfavorable 
reaction from virtually all nations except China, North 
Vietnam, and North Korea. Non-government papers in several 
countries, such as the communist Ludu of Burma, also backed 
Indonesia. Throughout the first week of January the govern­
ment press in Djakarta published reports of the unfavorable 
response - apparently partly in an effort to dramatize the 
boldness of President Sukarno in defying world opinion.
early January 1965 new current
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ment of her intimate collaboration with Communist China. (**9) 
Although still dependent on the Soviets for much of his modern 
military hardware and spare parts for existing equipment,
Sukarno had always been attracted by the militancy, organiza­
tion, and economic progress of the Chinese. This attraction 
was heightened in a situation where he found himself nearly 
alone in advocating a revolutionary line both domestically and 
internationally. Moreover, for the moment at least, Chinese 
ideological compatibility was not offset by any major conflict 
of political interests in what each country saw for the time 
being as its respective sphere of influence in Asia. The re­
markable congruence of Chinese and Indonesian interests during 
the early months of 1965 found concrete expression in Subandno' s 
January mission to Peking. A week of formal talks produced 50 
million dollars in Chinese credits, a bitter joint denunciation 
of America as the chief imperialist enemy, and strong hints of 
a Sino-Indonesian campaign to establish a rival organization 
to the United Nations.(SO)
Indonesia's military escalation with its attendant inter­
national impact on her foreign relations in turn influenced the 
domestic political balance within the country.(51) On one hand, 
the position of the PKI was greatly enhanced as the President 
came more and more to echo its slogans and policies. But this 
visible leftward trend toward China abroad and toward the PKI 
at home stimulated the non-communist forces in Indonesia to 
reassess their stake in the "crush Malaysia" campaign. Cognizant 
of how the PKI had used the West Irian issue to further its 
political position, the military leaders sought means to pre­
vent the Malaysia issue from functioning too much to the PKI 
advantage. Reportedly such considerations led the army to 
back the President's own apparent inclination to seek a nego­
tiated settlement of the dispute in early March and perhaps 
again in early May.(52) The fact that Sukarno finally refused *5012
(**9) See earlier portions of this essay for comment on the
Djakarta-Peking relationship. Also see Mozingo, op. cit., 
pp. 53-8**, for the period covered here.
(50) Mozingo reports that the 50 million dollar credit was 
extended during the November 196** visit to Djakarta of 
Chen Yi. See ibid., pp. 69-72.
(51) This paragraph must be regarded as even more tentative and 
speculative than previous portions of the essay because it 
is based on the author's distillation of various rumors
in Djakarta in the spring of 1965.
(52) Several Western sources felt that a genuine initiative had 
come from the President in late February. At least one 
version pictured Foreign Minister Subandrio as having 
scuttled this initiative by sowing discord and confusion
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to enter into negotiations on both these occasions was widely 
interpreted as evidence of the new weight given to PKI and 
Chinese attitudes in his calculations. But as argued at the 
outset, it is always risky to say that Sukarno has become any­
one's captive. Although his policies may have been parallel to 
the Chinese and PKI lines at this juncture in history, it is 
well to remember that the roots of Sukarno's policy are much 
vaguer, much more romantic, and, above all, much more national­
istic than the scholastic teachings of Marxism-Leninism.
Rejection of Non-Alignment and Consolidation 
of the' Hew Emerging Forces ”
In the wake of the West Irian victory in August 1962, 
Sukarno found himself almost immediately engaged in an episode 
that would eventually emerge as Indonesia's first success in 
giving concrete, political form to the evolving concept of the 
new emerging forces. The "Sondhi Affair", as the episode is 
now remembered, arose out of Indonesia's refusal to issue in­
vitations to Taiwan and Israel to participate in the *tth Asian 
Games staged in Djakarta's new sports arena in late August 1962. 
Reflecting the growing divergence in Indonesian and Indian atti­
tudes and policies, the incident is more significant for its 
triggering Sukarno's impulsive decision to organize a rival 
sports festival —  the Games of the New Emerging Forces, or 
Ganefo. This decision, first announced in the fall of 1962, 
took firm shape in February 1963 when the International Olympic 
Committee voted to suspend Indonesia because of her discrimina­
tory treatment of Israel and Taiwan.
Issuing a formal call for a conference in Djakarta to 
organize GANEFO I, Indonesia again experienced the lukewarm 
response from Asian-African countries that she had met before 
in her efforts to launch a second AA Conference.(53) As two 53
among the various potential mediators. It should be noted, 
however, that Subandrio was a popular scapegoat among Wester­
ners in Djakarta and pro-Western Indonesians.
Speculation about talks revived in early May after a Tunku 
invitation to Sukarno. The prevalent notion at that time 
was that Indonesia was in such clear danger of defeat on 
the Malaysia question at the projected second AA Conference 
in June that she would have to make at least a temporary 
settlement in order to avoid acute embarrassment at the 
Conference. That this particular line of reasoning was 
injected into the rumor mill by the Malaysian side is not 
to be ruled out.
(53) One device that assisted in enrolling participants was the 
fact that the Indonesian government paid the travel expenses 
of the foreign participants. For this and several other 
aspects of the April Preparatory Conference for Ganefo, see
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years earlier, only the Chinese gave vigorous diplomatic and 
rumored material support for Sukarno’s initiative. Accordingly, 
the list of sponsors who appeared at the April organizational 
meeting provides a partial index of the character and limits of 
Asian-African political backing for Sukarno’s increasingly 
militant confrontation with the old established forces. Apart 
from the predictable support from the Chinese and North Vietnamese, 
the only Asian sponsors were Pakistan and Cambodia. From Africa 
came the wealthier and more active of the Casablanca group —  
Guinea and Mali; from the Middle East, the influential and 
ambitious United Arab Republic together with Iraq. Inevitably 
the Soviets also joined the venture in an obvious effort to 
retain Sukarno's affections and prevent China's manipulation 
of Ganefo for her own ends.
It is a credit to Indonesia's diplomatic skill that she 
could use this initial nucleus of support to rally over 50 
delegations to the November games. To be sure, the majority of 
the participants protected their stake in the 1964 Olympics by 
sending non-official or secondary teams. Nevertheless, Indo­
nesia succeeded in staging a gigantic sports festival that 
impressed Indonesians and foreigners alike. Moreover, she used 
the occasion of the games to sustain the presidential political 
challenge to the International Olympic Committee. At Indonesia's 
behest, the original sponsors together with 26 other countries 
agreed to establish a Ganefo Federation with the headquarters 
in Djakarta. The Federation in turn agreed to hold GANEFO II 
in Cairo in 1967. The concept of the new emerging forces had 
at last become a concrete political reality.(54)
Although preoccupied with Malaysia and Ganefo through most 
of 1963, Sukarno also persisted in his drive for a second AA 
Conference. Responding to the counter-initiative for a Non- 
Bloc Conference taken in October by the moderates —  India, 
the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia —  Indonesia joined 
with China and Pakistan in an intensive diplomatic campaign to 
win precedence for the AA Conference.*54 5) While failing to
Department of Information, Djakarta, "Documents on the 
Preparatory Conference for Ganefo held in Djakarta 27-29 
April 1963." For an acute analysis of some of the major 
ways in which Ganefo served Indonesian foreign and domestic 
purposes, see Pauker, Ewa T. "GANEFO I: Sports and Politics
in Djakarta", Asian Survey, Vol. 5, April 1965, pp. 171-185.
(54) For details of the Ganefo Congress and the Ganefo Federa­
tion see the special section from the government news 
agency bulletin Antara entitled "Berita Ganefo" which 
was published throughout the month of November 1963.
(55) Pakistan's Foreign Minister Bhutto gave his strong backing 
to a second AA Conference on November 24. See Antara, 
November 25, 1963. The first major Indonesian statements
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disrupt the plans for the Non-Bloc Conference which was set for 
October 1964 in Cairo, the three militants did succeed in launch­
ing their own project. A ministerial-level meeting held in 
Djakarta in April 1964 agreed to convene the lon^-deferred 
second AA Conference the following spring in Africa.(55)
At the October Non-Bloc Conference Sukarno's address en­
titled "The Era of Confrontat ion"(57) was aimed at the younger 
African nations and the liberation movements who still felt 
the urgency of destroying the colonial dragon.(58) To the dis­
tress of the conference*s sponsors Sukarno appears to have had 
some impact on at least six or seven of them. But the sponsors 
had even greater cause for irritation with him.(59) Moving be­
yond the position he staked out three years earlier at Belgrade, 
Sukarno ridiculed the idea that non-alignment still had a role 
to play in a world now marked by the f ragment at ion of the earlier 
cold war blocs. As if to underscore his point about the abate­
ment of cold war tensions, he omitted all reference to disarma­
ment and nuclear testing. Rather he focused on imperialism as 
the threat to peace. "World peace today," Sukarno argued, "is 
a problem of how to achieve security for the developing nations 
during this period of transition to a new order in the world." 
Trampling on another idea cherished by the moderates, he justi­
fied his unstable economy by insisting that the self-reliance 
induced through waging a vast combat against nekolim was more 
than worth the economic cost. Such was the priority on achiev­
ing self-reliance, or character-building, that all assistance 
from abroad was suspect. Here was the reasoning behind his now 
frequent cry of "go to hell with your aid" —  directed first at 
the United States and then at the U.N. agencies.
Apart from staking out a radical position publicly at odds 
with that of the rival power group members, Sukarno charged
appear in ibid., December 18, 1963, by Foreign Minister 
Subandrio anl~PNI Chairman Ali Sastroamidjojo.
(56) For the single fullest treatment of the preparatory con­
ference, see Weinstein, Franklin B., "The Second Asian- 
African Conference: Preliminary Bouts", Asian Survey,
Vol. 5, July 1965, pp. 359-373.
(57) See Department of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta, 1964, "The 
Era of Confrontation."
(58) Indonesia's interest in Africa is reflected in her expan­
sion of her diplomatic relations with countries south of 
the Sahara during 1964. See review article on this develop 
ment in The Indonesian Herald, December 30-31, 1964.
(59) See report of Hedrick Smith from Cairo in The New York 
Times, October 7, 1964.
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them with indifference to the anti-nekolira struggle in Africa.
In characterizing Yugoslavia, Indiaj" and even the United Arab 
Republic as "arrives" —  i.e., lacking in revolutionary vigor —  
Sukarno made plain his willingness to stand alone with a radi­
cal minority in Afro-Asian politics. It is this uncompromising 
determination to sacrifice the applause of the majority for the 
cause of building a militant nucleus of supporters that he 
exhibited in walking out of the Tokyo Olympics and then the 
United Nations.
A like determination seemed to guide Sukarno in the weeks 
of hectic diplomatic maneuver that preceded the projected 
second AA Conference (scheduled for Algiers in June 1965).
While Indonesia's numerous diplomatic emissaries to Afro-Asian 
capitals may have been more conciliatory in tone, Sukarno pub­
licly displayed contempt for those nations which declined to 
endorse his confrontation policy.(60) More particularly, he 
repeatedly committed himself —  seemingly irrevocably —  to 
his prime demand, namely that the "neo-colonialist project 
Malaysia" be denied admission to the conference.
Given Sukarno's rather isolated position in Afro-Asian 
circles in the spring of 1965, such a posture seemed to entail 
a number of grave risks for his policy.(61) The most immediate 
and serious one was that Sukarno would further isolate himself 
at the very time he still needed broad Afro-Asian support —  or 
at least broader than he currently enjoyed. On the question of 
Malaysia's admission to the conference he seemed in a very weak 
position. Thanks to India's active backing and her own improved
(60) Sukarno's personally-organized celebration in Djakarta in 
April of the tenth anniversary of the first Afro-Asian 
conference illustrated his apparent disregard for the feel­
ings of the conservative and moderate nations in the Afro- 
Asian world. Several delegations were irritated by his 
permitting the North Vietnamese to propagandize their cause 
at an occasion that Sukarno had promised would be ceremonial. 
Moreover, there were a number of smaller affronts to various 
delegations. The most outraged person of all was the Thai 
Foreign Minister who left the celebration and returned home 
in protest. See the Bangkok World, April 20-22, 1965, for 
the Thai view.
(61) The following discussion of Indonesia and the aborted 
seoond Afro-Asia conference of last June is based on in­
terviews the author had with diplomats in Djakarta, Kuala 
Lumpur, New Delhi, and Cairo during June and July, 1965.
The Indian press is particularly useful in dealing with 
the period because of ^ts inclusion of a greater range of 
analytical reports than the press of either Indonesia or 
the United Arab Republic.
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diplomacy, Malaysia had won at least passive support for her 
admission from over a majority of Afro-Asian nations. As for 
the prospects of winning conference endorsement for his con­
frontation policy and slogans, Sukarno again stood in a minor­
ity position —  though less so than on the Malaysia issue. But 
his uncompromising attitude threatened to further weaken his 
position because it ran counter to the dominant sentiment of 
the participants. Most prominently advocated by the influential 
Egyptians and the prospective hosts, the Algerians, this was a 
deep desire to preserve at least the appearance of Afro-Asian 
solidarity. This meant that showdowns on controversial issues 
must be avoided at all costs. The alternative was to risk an 
irreparable schism in the Afro-Asian world that could only serve 
to weaken and embarrass it in the eyes of other nations. Equal­
ly serious for many of the smaller nations heavily dependent on 
one or more of the great powers was the prospect of being forced 
to take sides on issues vital to the interests of their bene­
factors. By defying this dominant sentiment Sukarno also en­
dangered the most personal of his projects —  the Conference 
of the New Emerging Forces (Conefo) —  for which he hoped to 
win broad backing.X-62)
Without knowing the inner history of Indonesia's private 
lobbying in the capitals of two continents, no sure interpreta­
tion can be given for Sukarno's reasons for virtually ignoring 
the need for a more conciliatory approach to Afro-Asian moder­
ates. Apart from the President's typical enchantment with bold 
means to advance radical goals, the equally familiar presence 
of shrewdness in Indonesian policy must not be ignored. In 
some ways the Indonesian strategy was tailored to Djakarta's 
rather desperate minority position. On the Malaysian issue, 
for example, Indonesian diplomats would concede that Malaysia 
might indeed have a virtual majority behind her, but would then 
stress that the issue was likely to be settled by a committee 
set up by the conference of foreign ministers that would pre­
cede the full summit conference. In short, Indonesian tactics 
focused on the individual nations and the procedural devices 
that would ultimately decide Malaysia's fate. Moreover, the 
Indonesians —  and the Chinese —  seemed to calculate that a 
vociferous, uncompromising minority could prevail by intimi­
dating the largely passive majority. Some would desert the 
conference altogether in protest —  but by so doing reduce the 
weight of their views in conference discussions. Others would,
(62) The importance of Conefo to Sukarno apparently did inhibit 
his strategy for the second AA Conference in at least one 
major respect. It seemed to have been one of the key 
factors —  together with his desire for more arms and 
debt forgiveness —  that led Indonesia not to openly op­
pose Russian participation at the proposed Algiers con­
ference. This meant that the Sino-Indonesian working 
alliance was not complete.
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indeed, resist, but a few could be expected to appease the 
determined minority in the interests of conference harmony.
Whatever the true proportions of these various elements 
in the Indonesian strategy, it was never tested. The Bou- 
medienae coup intervened. It provided the moderates and the 
indifferent a convenient pretext for postponing the conference. 
In the wake of this sudden turn of events, Sukarno moved quickly 
to exploit the interval before November, the new date for the 
conference. At his initiative a "Little Summit" meeting was 
convened in Cairo at the end of June among the leaders of 
China, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic.
While the first three nations failed in their obvious bid to 
win Nasser's support on critical issues, such as Vietnam,
Soviet and Malaysian participation, and Kashmir, they did 
seize the initiative in the new round of maneuvers in antic­
ipation of the fall meeting.
Meanwhile, the Djakarta Chinese engineers worked fever­
ishly to construct the gigantic conference hall intended for 
Sukarno's Conference of the New Emerging Forces. Planned 
for August 1966 Conefo was to have marked the fulfillment of 
Sukarno's confrontation foreign policy. His concept of the 
new emerging forces would have at last found concrete politi­
cal expression in a formal grouping of the world's truly anti­
imperialist nations and elements that was clearly intended 
to rival the United Nations. Such was the unreduced scale 




In weighing the conduct of Indonesia's foreign policy 
under Guided Democracy even her critics acknowledge the skill 
with which she has carried it out. Bold, cunning, and un­
predictable , this conduct tends to keep her opponents off 
balance. Best illustrated by the methods employed to recover 
West Irian, Indonesia's executive astuteness commanded con­
siderable respect from diplomats.
The manner in which Indonesian policy was executed brings 
several adjectives to mind —  bold is perhaps the foremost of 
these, for it is this characteristic which justifies the des­
cription of "brinkmanship." To the bafflement of friends and 
adversaries Sukarno repeatedly took actions that have seemed 
to defy rational calculation of Indonesia's own self-interest. 
There seemed an incredible willingness to risk diplomatic em­
barrassment, as in the decision to leave the United Nations; 
economic dislocation, as in the abrupt decision to sever trade 
relations with Singapore; military disaster, as in the sending
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of new infiltrators into the Malayan peninsula after clear 
warning of British readiness to administer a bloody reprisal. 
Why? Even those who supported the President’s crusade of the 
new emerging forces often asked the same question.
Primary in the complex of factors behind this "brinkman­
ship" was the emotional nationalism that was at the forefront 
of the President's motivations. The ideological-psychological 
compulsions that led him to opt for confrontation over economic 
development also inevitably dictated a boldness in execution 
consistent with the spirit of his goals. Revolutionary goals 
demanded revolutionary implementation —  at least in the Presi­
dent’s eyes, not to mention the PKI and frequently the army. 
This approach is well illustrated by Sukarno's conscious effort 
to abandon "conventional" diplomacy for a revolutionary diplo­
macy. Not only did all Indonesian Foreign Ministry officials 
receive regular indoctrination in the President's credos, but 
they underwent annual military training for six weeks.
Reinforcing this revolutionary approach was a paradoxical 
self-confidence —  paradoxical because it was found in a Presi­
dent and a political elite still afflicted by inferiority feel­
ings. This confidence manifested itself as an unquestioning 
faith in Indonesia's ability to triumph over the most impossible 
odds. Encouraged by the success of the current revolutionary 
generation in defeating the Dutch, this confidence also found 
reinforcement in the President's ideological beliefs. There 
was the notion that self-reliant nations can only arise out of 
"struggle" over adversity. In addition, there was the Marxist 
conviction about the inevitability of history blessing the new 
emerging forces with victory over the imperialists and coloni­
alists. Particularly this latter belief appeared to have won 
wide acceptance in the political public. As such it provided 
not only a fertile ground for the regime's justifications of 
its bold demarches, but an important sustainer of the regime's 
own faith in history's favor.
Such is a partial indication of the deep-seated character 
of Indonesia's bold manner in advancing her confrontation policy 
By itself this boldness presented a challenge to the most per­
ceptive of diplomatic opponents. But to complicate matters Indo 
nesia's conduct of policy exhibited an almost contradictory 
quality concurrently with its boldness. This was a cunning, a 
deftness in maneuver, that won grudging respect from Indonesia's 
enemies as well as her friends. This respect derived from ad­
miration for Sukarno's masterful handling of the West Irian 
campaign, the success in organizing Ganefo, and Subandrio's 
finesse in handling conference politics. Another element in 
this reputation for cunning —  found chiefly among Western dip­
lomats —  was a dislike for Indonesia's goals that spilled over 
into a distrust for her methods. In any case, the reputation 
for cunning reached the point where diplomats were never sure 
that Djakarta's boldness was as irrational as it first appeared.
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An excellent example in this regard is the reaction of several 
diplomats to Indonesia’s sudden decision to quit the United 
Nations. Initial expression of shock at "Sukarno's insane im­
pulsiveness" soon gave way to a contrary set of assumptions 
about the roots of his decision. The suspicion arose that the 
decision must have been planned; that the Chinese Foreign Min­
ister must have been consulted; and that it must be connected 
with Indonesian plans to invade Malaysia. In short, there was 
a retreat from a "madness" interpretation to a "method" inter­
pretation.
The prominence of both boldness and cunning in Indonesia's 
policy in part explained the unpredictability in it. But other 
factors also contributed to unpredictability. One of these 
was the distortion of information that one can hypothesize must 
have occurred in the authoritarian Guided Democracy as data was 
filtered from below to the top. There was the ever present 
possibility that even the most trusted subordinate would lack 
the courage to tell the President the truth —  even when that 
"truth" was taken for granted by the other actors in a particu­
lar diplomatic episode. But there can be no hard evidence to 
demonstrate this point. Likewise evidence is impressionistic 
and circumstantial for another frequently mentioned factor.
This is the sensitivity of a young nation compounded by the 
personal vanity of its supreme leader. There are many stories 
of how Sukarno took offense at the insults and pressures from 
abroad. With a leader prone to outbursts, no observer could 
safely forecast the limits of Sukarno's moves, although a 
person might be able to anticipate their general direction. 
Moreover, in dealing with such a sensitive, volatile leader, 
no adversary can safely assume that conventional levers of 
economic and political or military pressure will produce their 
intended effect. Indeed, the very reverse is possible —  but 
not always. And herein lay the fundamental ingredient of 
unpredictability in Indonesia's policy moves.
"National Interest" and Foreign Policy
A proper evaluation of Indonesian foreign policy under 
Guided Democracy must consider more than the manner in which 
it was conducted. Ultimately, Djakarta's confrontation policy 
like any other one must be judged in terms of its effectiveness 
in advancing the "national interest." The absence of an objec­
tive definition for this ultimate criterion inevitably compli­
cates the evaluator's task, but it should not bar him from 
attempting an appraisal provided he specifies the particular 
meaning he gives the beguiling term "national interest
The Internal Impact
For most Western observers and probably a majority of Afro- 
Asian observers, the most critical index for measuring the
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"national interest" of a developing nation after several years 
of independence is that of economic progress. On this index, 
as noted at the outset, Sukarno himself would admit his low 
rating. He would debate with his critics only about the degree 
of his failure in the economic field. Moreover, despite offi­
cial propaganda to the contrary, Sukarno has as much as conceded 
that the economic failures of his government were the necessary 
concomitants of his confrontation foreign policy. The self- 
reliance theory of economic development which he set forth at 
the ,Cairo Conference became the guideline for Indonesia's new 
economic policy, and the deliberate invitation of economic hard­
ship became a plank in the government program. Ho better exam­
ple could be cited for the frank subordination of economic wel­
fare to political and ideological priorities.
It is precisely because of the frank character of Sukarno's 
priorities that it is both relevant and just to judge the inter­
nal impact of his foreign policy from a political and psycho­
logical standpoint as well as the more conventional economic one. 
Here the critical index is whether Sukarno's prosecution of an 
anti-nekolim crusade generated the political unity and the self- 
confidence that he claimed. Denied the statistical measures 
available in the economic sphere, there is no alternative to the 
use of the impressions registered by participants in and obser­
vers of Indonesian society. Generally, even Sukarno's opponents 
will credit him with building in Indonesia, at least for a while, 
the national feeling that is prerequisite to building a consensus 
in a transitional society. More directly bearing on political 
unity is Sukarno's widely recognized accomplishment in balancing 
and harnessing for a period of time Indonesia's antagonistic 
ideological, socio-religious, ethnic, and regional groupings. 
However, it is more difficult to estimate how much of this accom­
plishment has been due to his foreign policy as distinguished 
from his domestic political maneuverings. Still more basic in 
this regard is the question of how lasting was the feeling and 
substance of unity that Sukarno created. There is no indication 
that his nasakom formula for political integration took root in 
the attitudes of major political parties. Indeed, it is just 
for this reason that some came to view Sukarno's achievement as 
merely a holding operation. Even his supporters confessed appre­
hension about a post-Sukarno period when Indonesia would have 
the legacy of only the President's vague formulas, not the magic 
of his personality.
Related to the question of Sukarno's ability to develop 
political unity is the question of his success in building what 
he called "national character." Again only an impressionistic 
basis for evaluation is available. It is plain to even the 
foreign observer that Indonesians of the revolutionary and post­
revolutionary generations are much more confident than their 
elders in dealing with foreigners. Surely Sukarno's self-con­
scious policy of making Indonesia a leader in foreign affairs —  
whatever its impact abroad —  has given the politically aware
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Indonesian a greater sense of his nation's importance and, 
indeed, of his own importance. Moreover, the creation by 
Sukarno of various symbols of national prestige —  regardless 
of their cost —  flatters the ego of a people long taught that 
the construction of great monuments and the hosting of inter­
national conferences were outside the competence of "natives."
One can argue then that Sukarno's foreign policy has con­
tributed to the feeling of national unity and self-confidence 
in Indonesia. But, as noted above, it remains unclear in the 
long run how deep, how extensive, and how lasting these feel­
ings are. And, more fundamentally, one must ask whether 
Sukarno's priorities are themselves consistent with "national 
interest." Even if he built unity and confidence, was it worth 
the stagnation and —  at times —  suffering endured by his 
people in the economic sphere?
The Impact Abroad
The mixed and tentative appraisal given of the impact of 
Sukarno's foreign policy internally is paralleled by a similar 
appraisal of its impact externally. Sukarno's repeated stress 
on the priority of the "security of the developing countries"
—  of the necessity of complete political and economic inde­
pendence as the prior condition for genuine economic develop­
ment —  compels the commentator to ask whether Indonesia 
became more secure from foreign intervention between 1960 and 
1965.
Certainly Sukarno's foreign policy must be rated well in 
one aspect of national security. His policy during the West 
Irian campaign and subsequent to it resulted in the rise of a 
nearly modern military establishment. It easily dwarfed the 
forces of Indonesia's Maphilindo neighbors, and constituted a 
potential challenge to Australia which is not able to match 
Indonesia's army of H00,000. It must be quickly added, however, 
that Djakarta's economic and administrative weakness combined 
with its dependence on external sources for spare parts and 
new equipment seriously limit the potential of its newly-ac­
quired military might.
More relevant to an estimate of Indonesia's current secur­
ity from foreign intervention is the question of the effective­
ness of her "crush Malaysia" campaign, for this action must be 
viewed in part as the first concerted employment of her new 
military potential to expand her political influence regionally. 
Inspired by the masterful use of military, political, and dipV 
lomatic pressures to wrest West Irian from the Dutch, the 
"crush Malaysia" campaign proved largely unsuccessful. Al­
though Malaysia's supporters admit that the new federation 
would have been better off without Indonesia's confrontation, 
they see both her military incursions and her political sub­
version as "a flop." Moreover, from the standpoint of Indonesia's
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security, it can be argued that her Malaysia campaign actually 
boomeranged. As already pointed out, her aggressive behavior 
elicited a more than countervailing military response from the 
very Western powers that she sought to drive out of Southeast 
Asia. At the same time Indonesia sowed enough distrust in the 
minds of her once sympathetic Malayan and Philippine neighbors 
to make them much more receptive to the perpetuation of their 
Western military bases than they might otherwise have been. In 
short, the "crush Malaysia" campaign led to more "Western encir­
clement" rather than less.
Before one embraces this argument that Sukarno's confronta­
tion with Malaysia boomeranged, some important qualifications 
must be entered in the ledger. If again the issue is seen from 
Sukarno's standpoint, it is noteworthy that his supporters would 
concede a number of the adverse effects of confrontation. They 
would, however, stress the transitory nature of both the new 
Western commitments to Malaysia's defense and the injured feel­
ings of Indonesia's neighbors. The latter would pass with time 
and with the advent of more "progressive" governments in those 
nations. As for Western resolve, there were already signs of 
Britain's impatience with the financial burden of her defense 
commitment to Malaysia. In addition, the neo-isolationist senti­
ment emerging in both Britain and the United States would crys­
tallize with the deepening disaster of American policy in Viet­
nam. In short, Indonesia would argue that the short-term pres­
sures she placed upon the Western powers would reinforce what 
she saw as the basic trend in Asian international relations -- 
the eclipse of the influence of the West by the resurgence of 
Asian nations led by a militantly anti-imperialist vanguard 
centered in Djakarta and Peking.
Thus in rendering a final estimate the analyst again en­
counters Sukarno's undaunted faith in the historical inevitabil­
ity of his new emerging forces prevailing. It is this faith 
that insulated him from despair over signs of deepening Western 
hostility and budding Afro-Asian distrust. In Sukarno's view 
such developments were necessary aspects of the struggle that 
would end in victory for the new emerging forces. Such was the 
engrained premise that colors his perception of the world and 
inspires a confrontation foreign policy. And in conclusion, the 
honest observer must recognize the compelling, if simple, logic 
of Sukarno's basic approach. Confronted with the reality of 
Western political and economic dominance in world affairs gener­
ally as well as in his own region, Sukarno saw no other way to 
achieve his personal-national aspiration for influence and 
respect than by relentlessly battling against the West.
